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Abstract 
Both lay concept and scientific theory have embraced the view that nonpathological worry 
may be helpful for defining and analyzing problems. To evaluate the quality of problem 
elaborations, concreteness is a key variable. Two studies with nonclinical student samples 
are presented in which participants elaborated topics associated with different degrees of 
worry. In Study 1, participants' elaborations were assessed using problem elaboration 
charts; in Study 2, they were assessed using catastrophizing interviews. When participants' 
problem elaborations were rated for concreteness, both studies showed an inverse relation-
ship between degree of worry and concreteness: The more participants worried about a 
given topic the less concrete was the content of their elaboration. The results challenge the 
view that worry may promote better problem analyses. Instead they conform to the view 
that worry is a cognitive avoidance response. 
 





Many people hold the belief that worrying may be helpful in analyzing everyday 
problems. This goes both for normal individuals (Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & 
Ladouceur, 1994; Tallis, Davey, & Capuzzo, 1994) and for pathological worriers 
(Borkovec & Roemer, 1995). Yet, this assumption is not just held by people. Many 
researchers have also embraced the view that worry may be associated with better analysis 
and definition of problems (e.g., Breznitz, 1971; Davey, 1994a; MacGregor, 1991; 
Schönpflug, 1989). In particular, nonpathological worry, that is worry as observed in 
nonclinical individuals, is hypothesized to assist in "motivating the individual and helping 
him or her to define and think through any potential problem in good time" (Davey, 1994a, 
p. 38). 
Empirical research on worry and problem solving, however, has produced mixed re-
sults. Some studies found worry to be positively correlated with problem-focused coping 
(Davey, 1993; Davey, Hampton, Farrell, & Davidson, 1992). Other studies found worry to 
be unrelated to problem-solving ability and negatively correlated with problem-solving 
confidence (Davey, 1994b; Ladouceur, Blais, Freeston, & Dugas, 1998). Yet, because all of 
these studies did not directly address the quality of problem analysis, their implications for 
the present question are unclear. 
To our knowledge, there is so far only one series of studies directly addressing 
worry and the quality of problem analysis, namely the one by Stöber (1996, Studies 2-4). In 
these studies, participants were presented with topics associated with different degrees of 
worry. Each topic was presented as a focal problem in a problem elaboration chart, and 
participants were asked to elaborate the given problem by writing down (a) as many 
potential antecedents for this problem and (b) as many negative consequences of this 
problem as they could think of. When these problem elaborations were rated for 
concreteness, it was found that worrisome topics were associated with problem elaborations 
of reduced concreteness compared to problem elaboration of non-worry topics. According 
to Schönpflug (1989), concreteness is a key variable with respect to the quality of problem 
analysis and definition. Only "through concreteness, anticipations of future events and 
actions gain some of the probative force and self-explanatory power of perceptions. They 
can serve as internal task models … for which action plans can be developed" (p. 248). 
Consequently, the results of Stöber's (1996) studies were interpreted as evidence that, 
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contrary to common belief and some scientific theory, worry was associated with poorer 
problem analysis. 
However, Stöber's (1996) findings had two major limitations. First, strong evidence 
for an inverse relationship between worry and concreteness was found only after post-hoc 
aggregation of findings across studies, rendering the validity and replicability of the results 
questionable. Second, all studies used the same method to assess worrisome problem elabo-
rations, namely problem elaboration charts. Consequently, the results may be method-
specific and thus of limited generality. Therefore, the aim of the following two studies was 
to overcome the limitations of the previous findings. For this, two changes were introduced. 
First, the degree of worry was systematically varied within studies. Second, the two studies 
used different methods to assess problem elaboration. Whereas Study 1 used again problem 
elaboration charts (Stöber, 1996), Study 2 used catastrophizing interviews (Vasey & Borko-
vec, 1992). In line with Stöber's (1996) findings, we expected for both studies an inverse 




A sample of 60 students (36 women) was recruited at the Free University of Berlin, 
the majority of whom (49) were majoring in psychology. Average age was 26.2 years (SD 
= 4.3). All participants volunteered in exchange for two hours of extra course credit.  
Procedure  
Worry-topic selection. Following previous studies (East & Watts, 1994; Stöber, 
1996), we chose the Worry Domains Questionnaire (WDQ) (Tallis, Eysenck, & Mathews, 
1992; German version by Stöber, 1995) as a list of potential worry topics. The WDQ is a 
questionnaire on nonpathological worry, with the 25 items covering a broad range of every-
day worries from different domains such as relationships, finances, or work (cf. Joormann 
& Stöber, 1997). For each item (e.g., "that I run out of money", "that I may lose close 
friends"), respondents indicate their degree of worry on a five-point scale with the answer 
categories Not at all (0), A little (1), Moderately (2), Quite a bit (3), and Extremely (4). 
Thus, the WDQ items allow for the selection of worry topics associated with different de-
grees of worry.  
All experiments were conducted in individual sessions. First, participants filled out 
the WDQ. Then, the experimenter asked them to look at their WDQ answers and select two 
WDQ items about which they had indicated not to worry at all (i.e., two items for which 
they had had checked the answer category Not at all); two items about which they had indi-
cated a low amount of worry (i.e., two items for which they had checked the answer cate-
gory A little); and two items about which they had indicated the greatest amount of worry 
(i.e., two items for which they had given the highest ratings). The latter items showed a 
mean endorsement of M = 2.6 (SD = 0.7). Translated back to the WDQ answer scale, this 
indicated that participants worried about these items between Moderately and Quite a bit.  
These six items were used as topics for the consecutive problem elaboration proce-
dure. The two topics of each worry level (i.e., the two no-worry topics, the two low-worry 
topics, and the two high-worry topics) were blocked, forming three blocks. The sequence in 
which these blocks were presented was randomly assigned and counterbalanced across par-
ticipants.  
Problem elaboration charts. Each topic was written into a box labeled "problem" lo-
cated in the middle of a problem elaboration chart with three empty boxes on the left side 
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and three empty boxes on the right side (cf. Stöber, 1998, Fig. 1). Participants were asked to 
write down (a) three potential antecedents for the problem into the three boxes of the left 
side and (b) three potential negative consequences of the problem in the three boxes on the 
right side of the chart. There were no time limits. After finishing with all six problem elabo-
rations, participants were fully debriefed. This included the information that their problem 
elaborations would be rated for concreteness. Participants were informed that they could 
withdraw from the study without consequences. However, no one did.  
Concreteness ratings. To assess the concreteness of participants' problem elabora-
tions, the three authors rated each antecedent and each consequence that participants had 
written down on five-point scale from Abstract (1) to Concrete (5).1 This was done inde-
pendently and blind to the experimental condition. To enhance reliability, ratings were ag-
gregated across antecedents and consequences, raters, and topics at each worry level. With 
an intraclass correlation (Shrout & Fleiss, 1979, Case 3) of ICC = .97, the reliability of 
these aggregates was highly satisfactory.  
Results and Discussion 
Concreteness ratings were subjected to a one-way ANOVA with worry level as a 
three-level repeated-measurement factor. As expected, there was a significant effect of 
worry level (cf. Table 1, Study 1). In line with previous findings (Stöber, 1996), the con-
creteness of problem elaborations differed significantly across worry levels. These differ-
ences followed a linear trend: The greater the degree of worry, the less concrete the 
problem elaborations. Post-hoc comparisons indicated that all three means differed 
significantly. To control if these differences were due to differences in the topics selected 
for problem elaboration, we calculated an ANOVA on the concreteness of the selected 
topics.2 Results showed that the selected topics did not differ with respect to concreteness: 
Overall ANOVA effect and linear trend were both nonsignificant with Fs < 1 (Table 1). 
Thus, the lower concreteness of worrisome problem elaborations was not due to lower 
concreteness of the selected topics.  
Whereas the present results corroborated the previous findings (Stöber, 1996), it is 
possible to raise a potential problem with the problem elaboration method employed in all 
preceding studies. Generating antecedents and consequences for a problem topic may be a 
rather artificial construction task compared to the automatic questioning style that is typical 
of worrisome self-talk (Borkovec, 1994). Therefore, in a second study, we employed an 
alternative method for assessing worrisome elaborations, namely the catastrophizing inter-
view (Vasey & Borkovec, 1992). Specifically relating to the chain-like structure of worry, 
this method represents a good way of capturing the worrier's catastrophizing in its "natural" 
flow. With this, the primary aim of Study 2 was to demonstrate generalizability of the pre-




A second sample of 60 students (45 women) was recruited at the Free University of 
Berlin, most of whom (55) were majoring in psychology. Average age was 26.5 years (SD 
= 6.0). Again, all participants volunteered in exchange for two hours of extra course credit.  
Procedure 
Worry-topic selection. The procedure for selecting six worry topics was exactly the 
same as in Study 1. Participants worried about no-worry topics Not at all and about low-
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worry topics A little. The high-worry topics had a mean endorsement of M = 2.9 (SD = 0.7). 
Translated back to the WDQ answer scale, this indicated that participants worried about the 
high-worry topics on average Quite a bit.  
Catastrophizing interviews. To simplify procedure and data analysis, the original 
procedure of the catastrophizing interview (Vasey & Borkovec, 1992) was modified. First, 
we replaced the two-step questioning procedure with the one-step questioning procedure 
introduced by Davey, Jubb, and Cameron (1996). In this, the only question was "What is it 
that worries you most about X?". At the first step, X was substituted with the selected topic. 
At the second step, X was substituted with the answer that the participant gave in the first 
step. This procedure was repeated until the participant could not think of any further an-
swers, repeated answers, or refused to continue (for details, see Davey et al., 1996). Second, 
we asked participants to write down their answers instead of tape-recording them (as was 
the case in previous studies). Apart from using the catastrophizing procedure instead of the 
problem elaboration charts, all other procedures (i.e., topic blocking, random allocation, 
counterbalancing, and debriefing) were exactly the same as in Study 1.  
Concreteness ratings. For each topic, participants wrote down on average 7.3 catas-
trophizing steps (SD = 2.5). The number of steps did not differ significantly between worry 
levels, F(2, 118) = 1.47, p > .23. As in Study 1, we rated all steps for concreteness inde-
pendently and blind to experimental condition. When these ratings were aggregated across 
catastrophizing steps, raters, and topics at each worry level, reliability was again highly sat-
isfactory, ICC = .93. 
Results  
As in the first study, the one-way ANOVA on concreteness showed a significant ef-
fect of worry level (cf. Table 1, Study 2). Also the linear trend was again significant: The 
more worrisome the topic, the less the concreteness of the catastrophizing steps. This time, 
however, only two of the three post-hoc comparisons were significant. Whereas elabora-
tions of low-worry topics and elaborations of high-worry topics both differed significantly 
from elaborations of no-worry topics, elaborations of low-worry topics and elaborations of 
high-worry topics did not differ. As in Study 1, we controlled for differences in the con-
creteness of the selected topics. Results showed that the selected topics did not differ. 
Again, ANOVA effect and linear trend were both nonsignificant with Fs < 1 (Table 1).  
General Discussion 
In sum, the findings of the two present studies replicated and extended the findings 
of Stöber (1996). In both studies, worry was associated with problem elaborations of re-
duced concreteness when compared to worry-free elaborations. Moreover, we found that 
this association followed a linear trend. The more worrisome the topic was, the less con-
crete were the participants' problem elaborations. Even when participants worried only a 
little bit about a selected topic, their problem elaborations were less concrete compared 
those for topics of no concern. Moreover, the fact that these results were obtained with two 
different procedures, namely problem elaboration charts (Stöber, 1996) in Study 1 and 
catastrophizing interviews (Vasey & Borkovec, 1992) in Study 2, indicates that the findings 
are generalizable across different procedures for assessing problem elaborations.  
The limitations of the present studies pertain mainly to three points. First, the data 
are only correlational. This leaves the causal direction in the inverse relationship between 
worry and concreteness an open question. Even though we would favor the interpretation 
that worry leads to more abstract problem elaborations, the present findings are also con-
sistent with the interpretation that (past) failure to achieve a concrete analysis of a given 
problem may have resulted in worry. Therefore, future studies should employ also experi-
Worry and Problem Elaborations     6 
mental designs with a manipulation of amount of worry. Second, both studies used non-
clinical student samples. Consequently, it remains unclear if the present findings may gen-
eralize to pathological worriers such as clients diagnosed with generalized anxiety disorder 
(cf. American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Future research should therefore investigate 
problem elaboration associated with clinical states of worry. Third, concreteness ratings by 
external raters may not reflect the subjective concreteness for the participants. For example, 
it may hold that repeatedly worrying about a certain topic may have lead to a "compilation" 
of the associated mental representations (cf. Anderson, 1987). To an external rater, the 
compilation (e.g., trouble at work) would be less concrete compared to some uncompiled 
representations (e.g., I won't be able to finish the assigned work and my boss will be angry 
again). For the person worrying, however, it may be just as concrete. Therefore, future 
studies should obtain concreteness ratings also from the participants themselves. 
Still, by demonstrating that even low levels of nonpathological worry were associ-
ated with less concrete problem elaborations, the present findings challenge views that 
worry may be helpful for defining and analyzing problems. Appropriate definition and 
analysis of problems have been identified as important steps on the way to problem solution 
(D'Zurilla & Goldfried, 1971). In this, concreteness may be a key variable. Concrete prob-
lem elaborations may not only motivate the individual to counteract the perceived risks 
(prevention) or to prepare for the expected negative consequences (anticipatory coping), but 
may also show concrete ways of doing so (Schönpflug, 1989; Stöber, 1998). Consequently, 
if worry is associated with problem elaborations of reduced concreteness, worry may rather 
impede detection and implementation of appropriate problem solutions.  
Whereas the present findings challenge views that worry helps problem solving, 
they support views that worry is associated with avoidance of aversive imagery (Borkovec, 
1994; Borkovec, Ray, & Stöber, 1998). Research in the framework of dual-coding theory 
(Paivio, 1986) has long demonstrated that there is an intimate link between the concreteness 
of words and sentences and the speed, ease, and vividness of associated imagery. In com-
parison to more concrete words and sentences, less concrete words and sentences elicit 
elaborate mental images much slower and with less ease. Moreover, the associated imagery 
is less vivid, compared to imagery associated with more concrete verbal material (Mar-
schark & Cornoldi, 1991; Paivio, 1991). Consequently, if worry is associated with reduced 
concreteness, this may explain how worry helps to escape aversive imagery (cf. Stöber, 
1998, in press). With this, the present findings on worry, problem elaboration, and con-
creteness may not only question some long-held views on worry and problem analysis, but 
also may open up new perspectives on the relationship between worry, thoughts, and im-
agery. 
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Footnotes 
1To enhance applicability, the scale's endpoints were anchored. Abstract (1) was an-
chored with the labels "indistinct, cross-situational, equivocal, unclear, aggregated", Con-
crete (5) was anchored with the labels "distinct, situationally specific, unequivocal, clear, 
singular". 
2As the concreteness value of the selected topics, we took the mean concreteness of 
the respective WDQ items from a previous study in which a sample of 16 students had 
rated all WDQ items for concreteness (see Stöber, 1996, p. 243).  
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Table 1 
Worry, Concreteness, and Problem Elaboration in Study 1 (Problem Elaboration Charts) and Study 2 (Catastrophizing Interviews)  
   Worry  Test 
   None  Low  High  ANOVA Linear trend 
Study Concreteness of …     M      (SD)     M  (SD)     M  (SD)  F(2, 118) F(1, 59) 
Study 1 Problem elaboration   3.53a (0.57)  3.29b (0.58)  3.08c (0.48) 15.91*** 31.78*** 
 Selected topic  3.31 (0.75)  3.37 (0.62)  3.42 (0.55)  0.35 0.61 
Study 2 Problem elaboration   2.99a (0.46)  2.77b (0.41)  2.74b (0.43)  7.39*** 12.25*** 
 Selected topic  3.33 (0.75)  3.32 (0.64)  3.43 (0.60)  0.52 0.56 
Note. Each study with N = 60. Concreteness was rated on a five-point scale from Abstract (1) to Concrete (5). Within rows, means with 
different subscripts are significantly different with p < .05 (pair-wise t tests, alpha level adjusted according to Holm's weighted Bonferroni 
procedure; cf. Holland & Copenhaver, 1988).  
***p < .001 
